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John V Orth*

‘The Golden Metwand’:
The Measure of Justice in Shakespeare’s
Measure for Measure
Measure for Measure, one of Shakespeare’s ‘problem plays’, is a dark
comedy depicting Duke Vincentio’s efforts to restore respect for the
law after a period of lax enforcement. Peopled with a wide variety of
law-enforcers and law-breakers, the play implicates numerous legal
issues and has consequently attracted the attention of lawyers and
judges. In the 18th century Sir William Blackstone contributed notes
on the play, and in the 20th century judges have quoted from it in their
judicial opinions. Like all good legal dramas, Measure for Measure
ends with a trial scene, but one in which the Duke orders the accused
to judge his own case, thereby forcing him to confront his own guilt,
while Shakespeare forces us all to confront the difficulty of doing
earthly justice.

S

hakespeare’s Measure for Measure was first performed by His Majesty’s
Players before King James I and his court on 26 December 1604.1 The King
must have been pleased with the play, which involved a princely figure not
unlike himself rooting out corruption and dispensing justice ‘like power divine’;
he ordered a repeat performance a week later. Long recognised as a ‘law play’ —
John Mortimer recently included it on his short list of the best fictional portrayals
of the legal world2 — Measure for Measure ends appropriately with a trial scene,
but (as we would expect from Shakespeare) one with an unusual twist. During the
final Act, charges of corruption are brought against Angelo, the deputy who ruled
Vienna during the temporary absence of its Duke, Vincentio. The newly returned
Duke orders an immediate trial: ‘Come, cousin Angelo, / In this I’ll be impartial; be
you judge / Of your own cause.’3
*
1

2

3

William Rand Kenan, Jr. Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of
Law AB (1969), (Oberlin); JD (1974), MA (1975), PhD (1977), (Harvard).
R C Bald ‘Introduction’ in Pelican Shakespeare: Measure for Measure (1956) 15
(reporting the performance ‘by his Majesties plaiers’ (otherwise known as ‘The
King’s Men’) of ‘a play Caled Mesur for Mesur’ by ‘Shaxberd’). Line references to
Acts and scenes are as numbered in this edition.
John Mortimer, ‘Five Best: John Mortimer Presents His Case for These Fictional
Portraits of the Legal World’, Wall Street Journal (New York) 24–5 February 2007,
10. The other entries were three classic 19 th-century novels — Bleak House and
Great Expectations by Charles Dickens and Orley Farm by Anthony Trollope — and
one modern crime novel, A Certain Justice by P D James. Measure for Measure was
the only play.
5.1.165–7.
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Royal reaction to this remarkable order has been lost to time, but Shakespeare’s
first editors were clearly shocked. Theobald commented, ‘Surely, this Duke had
odd notions of Impartiality; to profess it, and then commit the Decision of a Cause
to the Person accus’d of being the Criminal,’ and concluded in the innocency of
those early days of Shakespeare scholarship, ‘the Poet must have wrote as I have
corrected [him], In this I will be partial …’.4 Malone sensibly restored the text as
attested by the First Folio, but palliated the usage by asserting that ‘impartial’
could sometimes be used to mean ‘partial’!5 That Shakespeare wrote just what he
intended is evidenced by the fact that he included a denunciation of the Duke’s
skewed order, delivered by none other than the Duke himself disguised as a friar:
‘The Duke’s unjust, / Thus to retort your manifest appeal / And put your trial in the
villain’s mouth / Which here you come to accuse.’6
As the theatre audience knows, the Duke had not, in fact, been absent but had
remained in Vienna in disguise in order to observe the effects of Angelo’s
governance. His stated purpose was to allow Angelo, whose reputation for
righteousness seemed unimpeachable, to restore respect for the law, which
had declined under the Duke’s too indulgent rule. ‘We have strict statutes and
most biting laws, / The needful bits and curbs to headstrong steeds, / Which for
this fourteen years we have let slip.’7 But the Duke also purposed a test of ‘the
4

5

6

7

Lewis Theobald, The Works of Shakespeare (1733 ed) vol 1, 387–8; see also A New
Variorum Edition of Shakespeare: Measure for Measure 247 (Mark Eccles, 1980 ed)
(collecting authorities).
Edmond Malone, The Plays and Poems of William Shakespeare (1821 ed) vol 9, 187
(citing, inter alia, the anonymous play, Swetnam the Woman-Hater (1620): ‘You are
impartial, and we do appeal / From you to judges more indifferent’).
5.1.298–301. Compare Portia’s observation in The Merchant of Venice — in the
casket scene, not the courtroom scene — that ‘to offend and judge are distinct
offices, / And of opposed natures’ (Pelican Shakespeare: The Merchant of Venice
(1959) 2.9.60–1). What could be expected from a judge in his own cause is made
plain in Twelfth Night, when Olivia comforts the wronged Malvolio: ‘Prithee be
content. / This practice hath most shrewdly passed upon thee; / But when we know
the grounds and authors of it, / Thou shalt be both the plaintiff and the judge / Of
thine own cause’ (Pelican Shakespeare: Twelfth Night (1958) 5.1.341–4). There
is something similar in Othello. The Venetian Duke comforts Brabantio, who had
accused the Moor of seducing his daughter Desdemona: ‘Whoe’re he be that in this
foul proceeding / Hath thus beguiled your daughter of herself, / And you of her, the
bloody book of law / You shall yourself read in the bitter letter / After your own
sense’ (Pelican Shakespeare: Othello (1958) 1.3.67–9).
1.3.19–21. In this one instance I have departed from the Pelican edition reading.
The First Folio prints ‘needful bits and curbs to headstrong weeds’. Pelican amends
‘weeds’ to ‘wills’, which makes more sense, but Theobald suggests ‘steeds’, which
seems to me to make even more sense and to fit better in the consonant-heavy line
(Theobald, above n 4, 306). Professor Jaffa has observed that the Duke’s plan is
reminiscent of Cesare Borgia’s Machiavellian scheme to pacify Romagna without
risking his own popularity (Henry V Jaffa, ‘Chastity as a Political Principle: An
Interpretation of Shakespeare’s Measure for Measure’ in J Alvis and T West (ed)
Shakespeare as Political Thinker (1981) 181, 188–9 (citing Niccolo Machiavelli, The
Prince (first published 1532) ch 7)).
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prenzie Angelo’ — ‘Hence shall we see, / If power change purpose, what our
seemers be’8 — a test the deputy all too quickly failed. Soon after sentencing
Claudio to death under a long-ignored law against fornication, Angelo succumbed
to temptation himself when petitioned by Claudio’s beautiful sister, Isabella,
an aspiring nun, and offered to pardon her brother in return for sex, demanding
fornication by the sister in return for pardoning it in the brother. By convenient
happenstance, the Duke knew of the hitherto overlooked fact that Angelo had
earlier jilted Mariana (her of ‘the moated grange’) after her dowry had been lost
and arranged to substitute one maiden for another in the dark to satisfy Angelo’s
concupiscence.9
Compounding his offence, Angelo had actually ordered the beheading of Claudio
to go ahead even as his own assault on Isabella’s maidenhead was (seemingly)
in prospect. Working in the background, the Duke managed to spare Claudio,
deceiving both Angelo and Isabella, so that on his re-emergence in his true
character in the final Act, he could stage-manage the trial of Angelo on the charges
brought by the aggrieved young woman. Knowing the truth of the matter, the Duke
is not in fact ‘impartial’ as he claims, but by observing whether Angelo will accept
the assignment to be ‘judge of your own cause’, he is posing a public test for the
unjust deputy, one Angelo also fails.
His corruption dramatically exposed, Angelo acknowledges that he is worthy to
die the death he intended for another: ‘Then, good prince, / No longer session hold
upon my shame, / But let my trial be mine own confession. / Immediate sentence,
then, and sequent death / Is all the grace I beg.’10 The Duke readily agrees: ‘An
Angelo for Claudio, death for death! / Haste still pays haste, and leisure answers
leisure, / Like doth quit like, and Measure still for Measure.’11 But on the plea of
Mariana, Angelo’s abandoned bride with whom he had unwittingly consummated
his marriage — joined dramatically by the wronged Isabella — the Duke relents,
and the play manages a happy ending, complete with all the obligatory marriages,
qualifying it technically for inclusion among Shakespeare’s comedies.
Measure for Measure is set apart from other plays by Shakespeare, and from plays
by his contemporaries, by the degree of attention it pays to law and legalism. TudorStuart drama is rich in images of justice, some of it quite specifically forensic.
Tim Stretton has estimated that a third or more of Elizabethan and Jacobean plays
8
9

10
11

1.3.53–4.
Many readers of Measure for Measure have wondered how the Duke knew of
Mariana’s mistreatment and why in light of that knowledge he trusted Angelo to
be the deputy in his apparent absence. Sir William Blackstone speculated that ‘the
duke probably had learnt of the story of Mariana in some of his former retirements,
“having ever loved the life removed”. And he had a suspicion that Angelo was but
a seemer and therefore stays to watch him’ (Edmond Malone, Supplement to the
Edition of Shakespeare’s Plays Published in 1778 by Samuel Johnson and George
Steevens (1780) vol 1, 103).
5.1.366–70.
5.1.405–7.
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included a trial, an arraignment, or a lawsuit.12 This is not surprising. Shakespeare
and his fellow dramatists had a unique relationship with law and lawyers. Many,
if not most, of the Tudor-Stuart playwrights themselves had legal training — or
less respectable brushes with the law.13 Ben Jonson had actually been convicted
of murdering a fellow actor.14 But as Schlegel long ago observed: ‘In Measure for
Measure Shakspeare [sic] was compelled by the nature of the subject to make his
poetry more familiar with criminal justice than is usual with him.’15
Not only were plays like Measure for Measure performed before the King and his
court, but the audience for contemporary drama almost always included lawyers
and judges, ‘His Majesty’s Players’ in the real life dramas daily enacted in the
King’s other courts, the courts of law. Many plays were actually performed in a
specifically legal venue, neither the royal court nor the licensed playhouses like the
Globe, but the Inns of Court. Shakespeare’s Comedy of Errors was performed at
Gray’s Inn in 1594 before what was described as ‘a riotous audience of learned
lawyers’,16 and Twelfth Night, which has little to do with the holiday of its title,
the last of the ‘twelve days of Christmas’, was performed as part of the season’s
festivities at Middle Temple in 1602.17
Perhaps present at the first performance of Measure for Measure was Sir Edward
Coke, then the King’s Attorney-General, although later his welcome at James’ court
would be uncertain.18 That Coke was familiar with Shakespeare’s plays cannot be
doubted. In one of his speeches to a grand jury he unmistakably echoed John of
Gaunt’s familiar speech in praise of England from Richard II — ‘This royal throne
of kings, this sceptre’d isle, / This earth of majesty, this seat of Mars, / This other
Eden, demi-paradise …’19 — in Coke’s paraphrase, ‘this sea-environed island …
this so-well planted, pleasant, fruitful world, accounted Eden’s paradise’.20
12
13
14
15

16
17
18

19
20

Tim Stretton, Women Waging Law in Elizabethan England (1998) 63.
Ibid 64.
Ben Jonson (C H Herford and Percy Simpson eds, 1925) vol 1, 18–9.
A W Schlegel, Lectures on Dramatic Art and Literature (John Black trans, 1889
ed, 2nd revised ed by A J W Morrison) 338 (lectures originally delivered in Vienna,
1809–11).
Paul A Jorgensen, ‘Introduction’ in Pelican Shakespeare: The Comedy of Errors
(1964) 16.
Charles T Prouty, ‘Introduction’ in Pelican Shakespeare: Twelfth Night (1958) 15.
Sir Edward Coke served as Attorney-General until 1606 when he became Chief
Justice of the Court of Common Pleas. In 1613 he was transferred to the position
of Chief Justice of the Court of King’s Bench but was dismissed in 1616 because
of his disagreement with the King. Coke subsequently became a leader of the
parliamentary opposition and was briefly imprisoned in the Tower in 1623. On his
release, he resumed his activity and took the lead in framing the Petition of Right in
1628. See generally Stephen D White, Sir Edward Coke and the Grievances of the
Commonwealth, 1621–28 (1979).
Pelican Shakespeare: Richard II (1957) 1.4.40–66.
The Lord Coke His Speech and Charge (1607), quoted in Allan D Boyer, Sir Edward
Coke and the Elizabethan Age (2003) 288.
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If Coke was in the audience for Measure for Measure, the representation of a man
taking jurisdiction in his own cause might have arrested his attention.21 He was
sensitive to the issue in the management of his own affairs, later deferring to a
colleague to judge a dispute between himself and his tenants at Stoke.22 And he was
almost certainly conversant with the legal question from his reading of Littleton’s
Tenures. When Measure for Measure premiered, Coke was probably already hard
at work on his massive commentary on that little treatise; Holdsworth thought he
worked on it his entire life.23
Perhaps prompted by an actual case, Littleton had posed the question: suppose it
was the custom of a certain manor that its lord could seize straying cattle and keep
them until their owner paid him a fine in the amount he assessed. Could such a
custom be accepted as part of the common law? To the sophisticated, or simply
worldly-wise, the potential for abuse in the case appeared obvious. As Littleton put
it (in Coke’s translation): ‘If he had dammages to the value of an halfpeny, he might
assess and have therefore an C. [hundred] pound, which should be against reason.’24
Reason is the test of custom, a custom claiming the force of law. Measured by
reason, this custom fails, ‘because it is against reason, that if wrong be done any
man, that he thereof should be his own judge’.25
To be your own judge, or even to have a serious conflict of interest, seems
obviously unfair, a violation of common sense as well as common law. The eversensible Dr Johnson thought it ‘the standing and perpetual rule of distributive
justice ... to believe no man in his own cause’.26 For just this reason, the common
law famously excluded the testimony of parties in their own lawsuits, a rule
memorably mocked by Charles Dickens in the ludicrous breach of promise suit,

21

22

23
24
25

26

I have earlier discussed the paradigm case of making a man a judge in his own cause
in Due Process of Law: A Brief History (2003) ch 2. Some of the same sources used
in that discussion are here put to a different use.
‘Thear grew sum smale questions between him and sum of his tenants at Stoke
about copies. He sent for me, prayed me to keep his court, and to order all things as
I sholde see cawse in justice, upon view of his rolles and that he wolde be contented
with what I determined withe him or against him’ (James Whitelocke, Liber
Famelicus (John Bruce ed, 1858) 50). James Whitelocke served with Coke on the
Court of King’s Bench.
William Holdsworth, History of English Law (3rd ed, 1945) vol 5, 466.
Edward Coke, Commentary upon Littleton (1628) section 212, 141a (‘s’il avoit
dammages forsque al value d’un mail, il puissoit assesser et aver pur ceo C. lib’).
Ibid (‘pur ceo que il est encounter reason, que si tort soit fait a un home, que
il de ceo serroit son judge demesne’). Reason remained a test of good custom for
Blackstone: ‘To make a particular custom good, the following are necessary
requisites … [among them, it must be] ‘reasonable; or rather, taken negatively …
not … unreasonable’ (William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England
(first published 1765–9, 1979 ed) vol 1, 76–8). Indeed, it still is: State ex rel Thornton
v Hay 462 P 2d 671, 677 (Or 1969) (citing Blackstone).
The Quotable Johnson (Stephen C Danckert ed, 1992) 74 (attributed).
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Bardell v Pickwick.27 In America, James Madison in the justly celebrated Federalist
No. 10 explained that ‘no man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, because
his interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his
integrity’.28
The evil is no less obvious in a non-common law legal system, such as that in the
Vienna of Measure for Measure — or in the Scotland from which King James
had lately come. In the Corpus Juris Civilis, Julian is quoted as saying that ‘if one
of the litigants has made the judge heir to all or part of his estate, another judge
must of necessity be appointed, because it is unfair to make someone judge in his
own affairs’.29 Canon law makes the possibility to profit from a decision one of the
grounds to exclude a judge.30 Blaise Pascal included among his recorded thoughts
that ‘the fairest man in the world is not allowed to be a judge in his own cause’.31
Four years after the first performance of Measure for Measure, James’ court was
the scene of another drama involving a sovereign and his deputy, in this case
King James himself and Sir Edward Coke, by then Chief Justice of the Court of
Common Pleas. According to his own account,32 Coke told James to his face that
the sovereign could not personally judge a cause between himself and his subjects
but had to act through his deputies, the judges. ‘The King in his own person
cannot adjudge any case either criminal, as treason, felony, &c. or betwixt party
and party, concerning his inheritance, chattels, goods, &c.’33 As Coke explained, ‘a
party cannot have remedy against the King; so if the King give any judgment, what
remedy can the party have?’ In a rare burst of tact, he omitted to point out that a
remedy would be required only if the King gave a mistaken judgment. In this case,
27

28
29

30

31
32

33

Charles Dickens, The Posthumous Papers of the Pickwick Club (first published
1836–37, 1948 ed) ch 34; see also William S Holdsworth, Charles Dickens as a Legal
Historian (1928) ch 4.
Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay, The Federalist (first published
1787–88, Benjamin Wright ed, 1961) 131.
Corpus Juris Civilis (Alan Watson trans, 1985 ed) 5.1.17 (‘si alter ex litigatoribus
iudicem solum heredem uel ex parte fecerit, alius iudex necessario sumendus est,
quia iniquum est aliquem suae rei iudicem fieri’).
The modern codification is in Canon 1448. (Code of Canon Law: Latin-English
Edition (1983) 522–3: ‘Iudex cognoscendam ne suscipiat causam, in qua ratione …
lucri faciendi aut damni vitandi, aliquid ipsius intersit’). Other grounds for exclusion
are consanguinity, affinity, fiduciary relationship, amity or enmity.
Blaise Pascal, Pensées (1670) frag 44 (‘Il n’est pas permis au plus equitable homme
du monde d’être juge en sa cause’).
Prohibitions del Roy (1608) 12 Coke 65; 77 ER 1342. Coke may have engaged
in a little playwriting himself. Holdsworth thinks it ‘likely that Coke, having
attended several Council meetings at which the king expressed his views as to the
subordination of the law to the king, gave a narrative in which he stated the royal
views, added authorities in favour of his own views, and threw it into a literary
form which bears little resemblance to the spoken words used on this particular
occasion … or the events which really happened’ (Holdsworth, above n 23, vol 5,
430).
Prohibitions del Roy (1608) 12 Coke 64–5; 77 ER 1342.
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it was the deputies who were impartial and the King who was trying to judge his
own cause.
To James’ retort that ‘the law was founded on reason and that he and others had
reason, as well as the Judges’, Coke made his famous reply about the distinctive
nature of legal reasoning, particularly in the common law:
Causes which concern the life, or inheritance, or goods, or fortunes of his
subjects, are not to be decided by natural reason but by the artificial reason
and judgment of law, which law is an act which requires long study and
experience, before that a man can attain cognizance of it. ... The law... is
‘the golden metwand and measure to try the causes of the subjects …, [it]
protect[s] His Majesty in safety and peace.34

Indelicately, Coke alluded to the fact that James, born and bred in Scotland and
only lately heir to the English Crown, was ‘not learned in the laws of his realm of
England’. When the King cried treason, Coke said he responded with high medieval
authority: ‘Bracton saith … Rex non debet esse sub homine, sed sub Deo et lege’
(the King must not be under man, but under God and the law)35 — before, that is, he
fell prostrate at the feet of the angry monarch.36
The ideal of a ‘government of laws and not of men’ crossed the Atlantic with
English settlers, beginning with the band that settled at Jamestown, Virginia, even
as James and Coke were facing off. After American Independence, John Adams,
like Coke linking the idea to the concept of separation of powers, spelled it out at
perhaps unnecessary length in the Massachusetts Constitution, where it still is:
In this Commonwealth, the legislative department shall never exercise the
executive and judicial powers, or either of them: The executive shall never
exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either of them: The judicial
shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either of them: to
the end it may be a government of laws and not of men.37
34

35

36
37

Prohibitions del Roy (1608) 12 Coke 65; 77 ER 1343. Coke also described the laws
of England as ‘the golden metwand, whereby all men’s causes are justly and evenly
measured’ in his Fourth Institute (1817) ch 47, 239.
Prohibitions del Roy (1608) 12 Coke 65; 77 ER 1343. The passage to which Coke
referred may be found in Bracton, De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae (S E Thorne
trans, George E Woodbine ed, 1968) vol 2, 33). In 1928, Harvard Law School Dean
Roscoe Pound chose a lapidary version of Coke’s admonition to inscribe over the
portal of the enlarged Langdell Hall: NON SVB HOMINE SED SVB DEO ET
LEGE (Arthur E Sutherland, The Law at Harvard: A History of Ideas and Men,
1817–1967 (1967) illustration facing page 243).
Catherine Drinker Bowen, The Lion and the Throne: The Life and Times of Sir
Edward Coke (1956) 305 (quoting Sir Rafe Boswell).
Mass. Const. of 1780, Decl. Rts. XXX, in The Popular Sources of Political
Authority: Documents on the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, at 447–8 (Oscar &
Mary Handlin eds 1966).
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John Marshall repeated the maxim ‘emphatically’ in Marbury v Madison, the
landmark case for ‘judicial review’, the doctrine that American judges have the
power to declare statutes unconstitutional and void.38
Two years after his historic face-off with King James, Coke returned to the problem
of ‘a judge in his own cause’ in that cause célèbre, Bonham’s Case.39 Dr Thomas
Bonham was charged by the Royal College of Physicians with practising physic
in London without a licence. As permitted by its royal charter, which had been
repeatedly confirmed by statute, the college tried Bonham in its own court. Finding
him guilty, it imposed sentence of fine and imprisonment, and — as also permitted
by its charter — prepared to pocket half the fine. When Bonham challenged his
confinement in an action for false imprisonment, Coke delivered an elaborate
opinion in his favour. Carefully reading the crabbed language of the ancient charter,
Coke found that the college was not in fact empowered to imprison for unlicensed
practice but only for malpractice, which had not been alleged.
Although technically the question of Bonham’s fine was not before him, Coke
addressed it anyway, acidly commenting that the physicians ‘cannot be judge,
ministers, and parties; judges to give sentence or judgment; ministers to make
summons; and parties to have the moiety of the forfeiture’.40 In characteristic
fashion, he capped his judgment with Latin reminiscent of the Corpus Juris:
‘aliquis non debet esse judex in propria causa...’ (someone ought not be a judge in
his own cause).41
As in Bonham’s Case, so in Measure for Measure the proper order of things
is turned upside down: a subordinate is deputed to try his own cause. Angelo is
now cast in the heroic role invoked in the medieval Chancellor of Oxford’s Case
(1430).42 Like the lord of the manor described by Littleton who claimed the right to
assess his own damages, the Chancellor of Oxford claimed the right to adjudicate
his own expenses in repairing pavements along the High Street left unrepaired by
the adjoining householders. The claim was resisted by the plea that the Chancellor
could not be a judge in his own cause. To answer that plea and to demonstrate
the possibility of fairness even in such a case, the unnamed serjeant arguing for
the Chancellor recited the fanciful tale of an early Pope who was accused by the
cardinals of a serious offence. When the Pope demanded that they judge him, they
refused because he was their superior, the temporal head of the church on earth.
So the Pope tried his own cause and condemned himself to death.43 Angelo, the
38
39
40
41
42
43

5 US (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) 163.
(1610) 8 Coke 107a; 77 ER 638.
Ibid, 118a.
Ibid. Cf Corpus Juris Civilis, above n 29, 5.1.17. See text at n 29 above.
(1430) Y B Hilary 8 Hen 6, f 18b, pl 6, described in D E C Yale, ‘Iudex in Propria
Causa: An Historical Excursus’ (1974) 33 Cambridge Law Journal 80, 92–5.
Yale thought the recitation of the legend was not meant to be taken seriously —
‘I suspect that the serjeant’s “fable” was intended for light relief at the end of a
morning’s argument rather than anything else’ — but conceded that it was ‘widely
believed in the Middle Ages’ (above n 42, 94).
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fallen angel in Measure for Measure, reaches the same conclusion, but only after
the intervention of the Duke, ‘like power divine’.
In the years that followed the first performance of Measure for Measure, the
relation between James and Parliament steadily deteriorated until, under his son
Charles I, civil war erupted, ending in the final defeat of the royal forces and the
trial and condemnation of the King by deputies — not his own, of course, but
Parliament’s. No one forty years earlier, not even Shakespeare, could have foreseen
this dramatic outcome.44
The ironies of history are never-ending. As a result of Parliament’s famous victory
over the Crown, consolidated by the Glorious Revolution of 1688, Parliament won
control over the law as well. Blackstone, commenting on the laws of England on the
eve of the American Revolution, was forced to admit that the common law had to
yield to legislation: ‘Where the common law and a statute differ, the common law
gives place to the statute …’45 To demonstrate once and for all that the old verities
were gone, the Commentator took up the hoary problem of a judge-in-his-owncause. It was ‘evil’, a violation of natural right, to be avoided if at all possible.46
A grant of general jurisdiction to a judge, ‘to try all causes that arise within his
manor of Dale’, should be construed not to extend to that extremity, ‘because it is
unreasonable that any man should determine his own quarrel’.47
But, Blackstone reluctantly conceded:
If we could conceive it possible for the parliament to enact, that he should
try as well his own causes as those of other persons, there is no court that
has power to defeat the intention of the legislature, when couched in such
evident and express words, as leave no doubt whether it was the intent of the
legislature or no.48

In short, Parliament could do what the common law could not do: defy reason itself.
‘If the parliament will positively enact a thing to be done which is unreasonable,
I know of no power that can control it.’49 Separation of powers, which Coke had
used as a bulwark against royal aggression, had become a barrier the courts could
44

45
46
47

48
49

Shakespeare was remembered at the time. The lines from Macbeth — ‘Nothing in
his life / Became him like the leaving it’ (1.4.3–4) — were reportedly applied to the
martyred king (Pelican Shakespeare: Macbeth (1956)).
Blackstone, above n 25, vol 1, 89 (canon of statutory construction no 7).
Ibid, vol 4, 8.
Ibid, vol 1, 91 (canon of statutory construction no 10: ‘Acts of parliament that
are impossible to be performed are of no validity, and if there arise out of them
collaterally any absurd consequences, manifestly contradictory to common reason,
they are, with regard to those collateral consequences, void’).
Ibid.
Ibid. For further discussion of Blackstone’s canons of statutory construction, see
John V Orth, ‘Blackstone’s Rules for the Construction of Statutes’ in Wilfrid Prest
(ed) Blackstone and His Commentaries: Biography, Law, History (2009) 79.
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not pass. Even without Duke Vincentio’s benign motive of dramatically exposing
injustice, Parliament could order its Angelos to try their own causes, and no court
in England could stop it.
But not in America! — at least not after Independence and the development
of American constitutional law. When in 1928 the United States Supreme Court
finally confronted the case of a-judge-in-his-own-cause, in the form of a statute that
allowed a magistrate to keep part of any fines he imposed, it found the practice a
violation of constitutionally protected due process.50 Sir Edward Coke would have
approved.
Whether Coke approved of the denouement in Measure for Measure is another
matter. The Duke’s pardon of all and sundry saved the play from a bloody ending,
but exemplified the kind of discretionary justice that precipitated the ‘war of the
writs’ between the courts of common law and equity. As Tim Stretton reminds us,
Coke and his fellow judges were inclined to strict enforcement, even of penal bonds
that almost (but not quite) reached the extremity of Shylock’s pound of flesh.51 In
Coke’s words: ‘All causes should be measured by the golden and straight metwand
of the law, and not by the incertain and crooked cord of Discretion.’52
As befits England’s greatest property lawyer, Coke’s chosen image of the law was
a metwand, also spelled (and perhaps usually pronounced) metewand, a sort of
yardstick used for the legal description of land by metes and bounds53 — the way it
is still done in some American states.54 Thinking of the law as a measuring rod also
came naturally to John Selden, Coke and Shakespeare’s scholarly contemporary,
who expressed the common law’s fear of discretionary justice by his memorable
comparison of equity to the length of the Chancellor’s foot:
For law we have a measure … [and] know what to trust to: equity is
according to the conscience of him that is Chancellor, and as it is larger or
narrower, so is equity. ‘Tis all one as if they should make the standard for the
measure we call a foot, to be the Chancellor’s foot.55
50
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52
53
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Tumey v Ohio, 273 US 510 (1928) (citing Bonham’s Case).
Tim Stretton, ‘Contract, Debt Litigation and Shakespeare’s The Merchant of Venice’
(2010) 31 Adelaide Law Review 111. In common with other common lawyers, Coke
believed that written instruments, and the terms they contained, needed to be taken
seriously and enforced, even in cases involving apparent injustice.
Edward Coke, above n 34, ch 1, 41.
Compare this with the entry in the table in Edward Coke, above n 34, under
‘Discretion’ (‘metewand’). According to tradition, King Henry I ‘made the length
of his own arm the standard of the mete-wand’: Francis Palgrave, The History of
Normandy and England (1851–64) vol 4, 709.
See, eg, Patrick K Hetrick and James B McLaughlin, Jr, Webster’s Real Estate Law
in North Carolina (5th ed, 1999) vol 1, 419 (‘In North Carolina the most usual method
of describing land, particularly nonurban and irregularly shaped tracts, is by metes
and bounds’).
Table Talk of John Selden (Frederick Pollock ed, 1927) 43 (spelling and punctuation
modernised).
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Images of weights and measures abound in Measure for Measure. Isabella admits,
‘We cannot weigh our brother with ourself’.56 Angelo, who before he succumbs to
temptation prides himself on his ‘gravity’, which he would not change ‘for an idle
plume / Which the air beats for vain’,57 is soon taunting Isabella: ‘Say what you can,
my false o’erweighs your true.’58 The Duke pretends to disbelieve Isabella when
she accuses Angelo because ‘If he had so offended, / He would have weighed thy
brother by himself, / And not have cut him off’.59 Finally, dropping his disguise, the
Duke proceeds ‘by cold gradation and well-balanced form’60 to have ‘the corrupt
deputy scaled’,61 weighed in the balance and found wanting — until, that is, he is
persuaded to pardon all offenders.
It is tempting to read the conclusion of Measure for Measure as the triumph of
mercy over justice, and the religiously inclined seem particularly to favour this
reading.62 But Shakespeare is obviously aware of the paradoxical nature of ‘the
quality of mercy’. Escalus, left by the Duke as second in command, early admits
that ‘Mercy is not itself, that oft looks so; / Pardon is still the nurse of second
woe’.63 As if to demonstrate the point, Mistress Overdone overdoes it in the next
Act when she pleads for mercy, provoking the exasperated response: ‘Double and
treble admonition, and still forfeit in / the same kind! This would make mercy
swear and play / the tyrant.’64 As the unsympathetic Angelo correctly observes:
‘Those many had not dared to do that evil, / If the first that did the edict infringe /
Had answer’d for his deed’.65 He unerringly puts his finger on the flaw in Isabella’s
facile argument that he should condemn the sin but pardon the sinner: ‘Condemn
the fault and not the actor of it? / Why, every fault’s condemned ere it be done.’66
Responding to her plea for pity, he makes the wise retort: ‘I show it most of all
when I show justice, / For then I pity those I do not know.’67
There is no greater danger in reading Shakespeare than reductionism. German
writers seem particularly susceptible. Richard Wagner in his early opera Das
Liebesverbot (usually translated as The Ban on Love) turned Measure for Measure
56
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61
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2.2.126. Theobald adopts William Warburton’s sensible suggestion that Shakespeare
intended ‘We cannot weigh our brother with yourself’ (Theobald, above n 4, vol 1,
338).
2.4.11–2.
2.4.170.
5.1.110–2.
4.3.97.
3.1.248.
See, eg, C M A McCauliff, ‘The Bawd and the Bard: Mercy Tempers Strict Statutory
Application in Shakespeare’s Measure for Measure’ (2004) 43 Catholic Lawyer 81;
Michael J Willson, ‘A View of Justice in Shakespeare’s The Merchant of Venice and
Measure for Measure’ (1995) 70 Notre Dame Law Review 695.
2.1.267–8.
3.2.181–3.
2.2.115.
2.2.37–8.
2.2.100.
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into a parody of German hypocrisy about sex,68 while Bertolt Brecht, trying to
repeat his success in adapting The Beggar’s Opera, succeeded only in producing
the forgettable Die Rundköpfe und die Spitzköpfe (Roundheads and Peakheads),69 a
Marxist caricature of official corruption and class bias.70
Curiously, among all the legal issues raised in Measure for Measure the one thing
not mentioned is the one that comes most readily to the restless modern mind: law
reform. Repeal the law against love, or at least reduce the sentence. The Duke in
disguise seems to hover on the edge of awareness: ‘Laws for all faults, / But faults
so countenanced that the strong statutes / Stand like forfeits in a barber’s shop, /
As much in mock as mark.’71 In fact, one modern legal scholar has read Measure
for Measure as Shakespeare’s dramatic manifesto against ‘laws seeking to enforce
private morality’,72 using it to condemn a 1986 United States Supreme Court
decision upholding the constitutionality of a state statute criminalising sodomy73 —
a decision, incidentally, the Court has since overturned.74
But this is just another reductionist reading of the play. Shakespeare is, of course,
acutely aware of the difficulty of legal enforcement in such matters. Pompey, the
clownish tapster, asks Escalus: ‘Does your worship mean to geld and splay all the /
youth of the city?’75 And the fantastic Lucio informs the Duke in disguise that ‘it
is impossible to extirp it quite, friar, / till eating and drinking be put / down’.76
The Provost observes that ‘all sects, all ages smack of this vice’.77 Even the saintly
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Wagner’s own plot summary of Das Liebesverbot (1836) is in his autobiography, My
Life (first published 1880, Andrew Gray trans, Mary Whittall ed, 1983) 113–8. For a
critical analysis of the opera, see Charles Osborne, The Complete Operas of Wagner
(1990) 40 (in which Wagner’s libretto is described as ‘a travesty of Shakespeare’s
play’). Das Liebesverbot received one of its rare public performances at the
Glimmerglass Opera in Cooperstown, New York from 19 July to 22 August 2008.
Reviews appeared in the New York Times (12 August 2008), Wall Street Journal
(13 August 2008), and Financial Times (15 August 2008). See also Opera News
(November 2008) 44–5.
Bertolt Brecht, Roundheads and Peakheads: Rich and Rich Make Good Company (N
Goold-Verschoyle trans, 1937), in Jungle of Cities and Other Plays (1966) 167–283.
For a more sympathetic assessment of Brecht’s adaptation and an argument that
he correctly understood Shakespeare’s meaning, see Louise Halper, ‘Measure for
Measure: Law, Prerogative, Subversion’ (2001) 13 Cardozo Studies in Law and
Literature 221. Daniel J Kornstein has his doubts. See ‘A Comment on Professor
Halper’s Reading of Measure for Measure’ (2001) 13 Cardozo Studies in Law and
Literature 265.
5.1.317–20. A learned New Jersey Superior Court Judge quoted the lines to illustrate
‘the laxity of law enforcement in the area of barber shops’: Tomasi v Wayne, 313 A 2d
229, 233 (NJ Super 1973) (Schwartz J).
Daniel J Kornstein, Kill All the Lawyers? Shakespeare’s Legal Appeal (1994) 35–51.
Bowers v Hardwick, 478 US 186 (1986).
Lawrence v Texas, 529 US 558 (2003).
2.1.217–8.
3.2.96–7.
2.2.5.
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Isabella is aware ‘there’s many have committed it’,78 and Angelo soliloquises ‘We
are all frail’79 — before, that is, rushing off to his assignation.
There is certainly a problem with what Judge Bork has described as laws that are
‘kept on the books as precatory statements, affirmations of moral principle’,80 often
involving sexual practices. But the legal enforcement of private morality is just an
extreme instance of a more general problem. So long as law forbids any form of
human behaviour, the guilty party will claim extenuating circumstances and appeal
to the judge for mercy. Whether Claudio should have been punished for fornication
or not — and much ink has been spilled on the question of what his ‘true contract’
with Juliet entitled him to81 —there seems little reason not to punish Angelo for his
obstruction of justice.82 Yet he is pardoned.
More than any other of his plays, Shakespeare’s Measure for Measure deals openly
with religious, specifically Christian, themes.83 The playwright all but puts the holy
name in Isabella’s mouth when, pleading for her brother, she invokes the doctrine
of the atonement: ‘Alas, alas; / Why, all the souls that were were forfeit once, / And
He that might the vantage best have took, / Found out the remedy.’84 The Duke’s
sentence on Angelo inevitably puts the Bible-conscious listener in mind of the
Sermon on the Mount: ‘Judge not, that ye be not judged. / For with what judgement
ye judge, ye shall be judged, and with what measure ye mete, it shall be measured
to you againe.’85
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Robert H Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law (1990)
96. See also Alexander M Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme
Court at the Bar of Politics (1962) 147. Both were referring to the birth control case,
Griswold v Connecticut, 381 US 479 (1965).
See, eg, S Nagarajan, ‘Measure for Measure and Elizabethan Betrothals’ (1963)
14 Shakespeare Quarterly 115; Karl P Wentersdorf, ‘The Marriage Contracts in
Measure for Measure’ (1979) 32 Shakespeare Survey 129; Margaret Scott, ‘‘Our
City’s Institutions’: Some Further Reflections on The Marriage Contracts in Measure
for Measure’ (1982) 49 English Literary History 790. See also McCauliff, above n 62.
Mariana’s plea for Angelo — ‘His act did not o’ertake his bad intent, / And must
be buried but as an intent / That perished by the way. Thoughts are no subjects, /
Intents but merely thoughts’ (5.1.447–9) — has been quoted to illustrate the
proposition that ‘in the criminal law, both a culpable mens rea and a criminal actus
reus are generally required for an offense to occur’ (US v Apfelbaum, 445 US 115,
132 (1980) (Rehnquist CJ) citing Glanville Williams, Criminal Law (2nd ed, 1961),
6). But although Angelo failed in his attempt to extort Isabella’s consent to sex, in
his attempt to order the untimely execution of Claudio, and in his attempt to acquit
himself of corruption — all due to the Duke’s behind-the-scenes intervention — he
did more than simply think about the attempts; he acted on them.
See generally Darryl Gless, Measure for Measure, the Law, and the Convent (1979).
2.2.72–5.
Matthew 7:1–2 (Geneva Bible).
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What is the Christian magistrate to do — charged with judging others, yet fearful
for his own salvation? The priggish Angelo has an answer. His first and second
response to Isabella’s plea for her brother’s life is to deny personal responsibility:
‘It is the law, not I, condemns your brother’.86 ‘I, now the voice of the recorded
law, / Pronounce a sentence on your brother’s life.’87 Richard Posner dismisses
the argument on rather flimsy Freudian grounds. Angelo’s legalism, he says,
is ‘connected with his being a natural underling, as well as with his effort to
transcend his body and become all spirit’; it is ‘associated with immature, weak,
and father-fixated personalities’.88
And yet I am not sure I know a better answer to the dilemma of judging than to
dissociate the person of the judge from the judicial office. ‘The law, not I ….’ It may
certainly, as in Measure for Measure, lead to arrogance in the person and harshness
in the result, which is the point of Isabella’s bitter outburst about ‘man, proud man, /
Dressed in a little brief authority, / Most ignorant of what he’s most assured’.89 But
it may also endow an individual with the courage to discharge his duty. Sir Edward
Coke probably did not need an access of courage, but his rallying cry to the House
of Commons may have emboldened others: ‘The common law hath admeasured
the King’s prerogative. It is not I, Edward Coke, that speaks it but the records that
speak it.’90 ‘I, now the voice of the recorded law …’
Sexual desire had threatened to overbalance the established order in Vienna, but in
the end all the sexual miscreants — Claudio, Angelo, Lucio, perhaps even the Duke
himself — are safely housed in matrimony, sentenced to marriage rather than to
death, to paraphrase W H Auden.91 But the play’s ending is actually no conclusion.
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Francis Biddle, US Attorney General from 1941 to 1945, entitled the second
volume of his autobiography, In Brief Authority (1962). Justice Eugene F Black of
the Michigan Supreme Court quoted the line five times in his judicial opinions:
Michigan State UAW Community Action Program Council (CAP) v Austin, 198 NW
2d 385, 404 (Mich 1972) (Black J, dissenting); Magreta v Ambassador Steel Co, 158
NW 2d 473, 476 (Mich 1968) (Black J, concurring); In re Apportionment of Michigan
Legislature, 140 NW 2d 436, 439 (Mich 1966) (Black, J); Taylor v Auditor General,
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604, 619 (Mich 1958) (Black J, dissenting). Susie Sharp, later the Chief Justice of
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judicial appointment (Anna R Hayes, Without Precedent: The Life of Susie Marshall
Sharp (2008) 146.
Quoted in Bowen, above n 36, 291
W H Auden, Lectures on Shakespeare (Arthur Kirsch ed, 2002) 191 (‘In the play, in
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As Schlegel observed long ago, since the Duke ‘ultimately extends a free pardon to
all the guilty, we do not see how his original purpose, in committing the execution
of the laws to other hands, of restoring their strictness, has in any wise been
accomplished’.92 At the end, we are back at the beginning.
There are many wise counsels for law and lawyers in Measure for Measure,
perhaps too many, for they tend to cancel one another out. At the risk of being
reductionist myself, I suggest that the judge-in-his-own-cause is the play’s central
image, reminding us that we are all in that predicament; that when we judge others,
we judge ourselves; that in some sense we in the legal profession should not be
doing what we must do. As Isabella challenged Angelo: ‘Go to your bosom; /
Knock there, and ask your heart what it doth know / That’s like my brother’s fault:
if it confess / A natural guiltiness such as is his, / Let it not sound a thought upon
your tongue / Against my brother’s life.’93 Judge not. May God have mercy on us
all!
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